Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
Request for Comments: 7382 D. Kong
BCP: 173 K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice BBN Technologies
ISSN: 2070-1721 April 2015
Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的认证实践声明（CPS）模板
Abstract
摘要
This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a resource allocation registry or an ISP.
本文档包含一个模板，用于为属于资源公钥基础架构 (RPKI) 的组织（如资源分配注册中心或互联网服务提供商）创建认证实践声明 (CPS)。
Status of This Memo
本备忘录的地位
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
本备忘录记录了互联网当前最佳做法。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组 (IETF) 的成果。它代表了 IETF 社区的共识。它已接受公众审查，并经互联网工程指导小组 (IESG) 批准发布。有关 BCP 的更多信息，请参见 RFC 5741 第 2 节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.
有关本文件的当前状态、任何勘误以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382。
Copyright Notice
版权声明
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有 (c) 2015 IETF 信托基金会和文件作者。保留所有权利。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文档受 BCP 78 和本文档发布之日有效的 IETF 信托基金《与 IETF 文档有关的法律规定》 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) 的约束。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文档的权利和限制。从本文档中提取的代码组件必须包含信托法律条款第 4.e 节中所述的简化 BSD 许可文本，并且不提供简化 BSD 许可中所述的担保。
Table of Contents
目录
Preface ............................................................8
1. Introduction ....................................................9
1.1. Overview ..................................................10
1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
3.1. Naming ....................................................15
3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
Trademarks .........................................16
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
Routine Re-key .....................................18
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
Re-key after Revocation ............................18
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
4.2.1. Performing Identification and
Authentication Functions ...........................19
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
Issuance of Certificate ............................20
4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................22
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Renewal Certificate ................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................22
4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................23
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................23
4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
Certificate ........................................24
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................24
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
Revocation Request .................................25
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
Parties ............................................25
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27
5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
Requirements .......................................27
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
External) [OMITTED] ................................29
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
Checking ...........................................30
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
Usage Field) .......................................30
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls ......................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
Cryptographic Module ...............................31
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
Pair Usage Periods .................................32
6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
9.1. Fees ......................................................34
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
Confidential Information ...........................34
9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
Information ........................................34
9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
Administrative Process .............................35
9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35
9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
Rights) ...........................................36
9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
10. Security Considerations .......................................36
11. References ....................................................37
11.1. Normative References .....................................37
11.2. Informative References ...................................37
Acknowledgments ...................................................38
Authors' Addresses ................................................38
Preface
序言
This RFC contains text intended for use as a template as designated below by the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>. Such Template Text is subject to the provisions of Section 9(b) of the Trust Legal Provisions.
本 RFC 包含旨在用作模板的文本，如下文标记 <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> 和 <END TEMPLATE TEXT> 所示。此类模板文本受《信托法律条款》第 9(b) 节规定的约束。
This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). (Throughout this document, the term "organization" is used broadly, e.g., the entity in question might be a business unit of a larger organization.)
本文档包含一个模板，用于为属于资源公钥基础设施 (RPKI) 的组织创建认证实践声明 (CPS)。(在本文档中，"组织 "一词被广泛使用，例如，相关实体可能是更大组织的一个业务部门）。
There is no expectation that a CPS will be published as an RFC. An organization will publish the CPS in a manner appropriate for access by the users of the RPKI, e.g., on the organization's web site. As a best current practice, organizations are expected to use this template instead of creating one from scratch. This template contains both text that SHOULD appear in all Certification Practice Statements and places for text specific to the organization in question (indicated by <text in angle brackets>).
CPS 不一定要作为 RFC 发布。组织将以适合 RPKI 用户访问的方式发布 CPS，例如在组织的网站上发布。作为当前的最佳实践，组织应使用本模板，而不是从头开始创建一个模板。本模板既包含所有认证实践声明中应该出现的文本，也包含有关组织特定文本的位置（用 < 角括弧中的文本> 表示）。
The user of this document should:
本文件的用户应
1. Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters.
1. 提取 <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> 和 <END TEMPLATE TEXT> 分隔符之间的文本。
2. Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the required information.
2. 用所需信息替换角括号之间的说明。
This document has been generated to complement the Certificate Policy (CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484]. Like RFC 6484, it is based on the template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647]. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC and in RFC 6484.
本文件是对 RPKI 的证书策略 (CP) [RFC6484] 的补充。与 RFC 6484 一样，它基于 RFC 3647 [RFC3647] 中指定的模板。本 CPS 省略了模板中的一些章节，因为它们不适用于本 PKI。不过，我们保留了该 RFC 中使用的章节编号方案，以便于与该 RFC 和 RFC 6484 中使用的章节编号方案进行比较。
Conventions Used in This Document:
本文件使用的约定：
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文档中的关键词 "MUST"、"MUST NOT"、"REQUIRED"、"SHALL"、"SHALL NOT"、"SHOULD"、"SHOULD NOT"、"RECOMMENDED"、"MAY "和 "OPTIONAL "应按照 [RFC2119] 中的描述进行解释。
<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>
<开始模板文本
<Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>
<创建标题页，例如"<组织名称>资源公钥基础设施 (RPKI) 认证实践声明"，并注明日期、作者等>。
<Create a table of contents.>
<创建目录>。
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name of organization>. It describes the practices employed by the <name of organization> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for the RPKI.
本文档是 < 组织名称> 的认证实务声明 (CPS)。它描述了 < 组织名称> 认证机构 (CA) 在资源公钥基础设施 (RPKI) 中采用的惯例。这些惯例是根据 RPKI 的证书策略 (CP) [RFC6484] 的要求定义的。
The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.
RPKI 旨在支持对互联网号码资源（INR）（第 1.6 节）的当前持有者根据在本 PKI 中充当 CA 的组织的记录提出的权利要求进行验证。验证这种权利要求的能力对于确保这些资源的唯一性和无歧义分配至关重要。
This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for INR distribution. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
该 PKI 与现有的 INR 分配层次结构相似。这些资源由互联网编号分配机构 (IANA) 分配给地区互联网注册管理机构 (RIR)。在某些地区，国家互联网注册管理机构（NIR）构成了低于区域互联网注册管理机构的 INR 分配层级。互联网服务提供商 (ISP) 和网络用户构成了低于注册机构的其他层级。
Conventions Used in This Document:
本文件使用的约定：
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文档中的关键词 "MUST"、"MUST NOT"、"REQUIRED"、"SHALL"、"SHALL NOT"、"SHOULD"、"SHOULD NOT"、"RECOMMENDED"、"MAY "和 "OPTIONAL "应按照 [RFC2119] 中的描述进行解释。
This CPS describes:
本 CPS 说明
o Participants
o 与会者
o Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
o 公布证书和证书吊销列表 (CRL)
o How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and revoked
o 如何签发、管理、重新键入、更新和撤销证书
o Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
o 设施管理（实体安全、人员、审计等）
o Key management
o 关键管理
o Audit procedures
o 审计程序
o Business and legal issues
o 商业和法律问题
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for more details):
这种公钥基础设施包括几种类型的证书（详见 [RFC6480]）：
o CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for each subscriber INR holder.
o 为每个分发 INR 的组织和每个订阅 INR 的人提供 CA 证书。
o End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in Section 1.6).
o 终端实体 (EE) 证书，供机构用于验证 RPKI 签名对象上的数字签名（参见第 1.6 节中的定义）。
o In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.
o 未来，公钥基础设施还可能包括终端实体证书，以支持第 2.4 节所述的存储库系统访问控制。
The name of this document is "<Name of organization> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)". <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can provide the URI for the CPS here. It SHOULD be the same URI as the URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>
本文档的名称为"<组织名称>资源公钥基础架构（RPKI）的认证实务声明"。<如果此文档可通过互联网获取，则 CA 可在此提供 CPS 的 URI。如果 CA 选择使用该功能，该 URI 应与 CA 证书中作为策略限定符出现的 URI 相同。
Note that in a PKI the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. In such cases, the term "network subscriber" will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of them are individuals.
请注意，在 PKI 中，"用户 "一词是指作为 CA 签发的证书主体的个人或组织。该术语在本文档中以这种方式使用，没有限定条件，不应与网络中使用该术语指从互联网服务提供商处接受服务的个人或组织相混淆。在这种情况下，将使用 "网络用户 "一词。另请注意，为简洁起见，本文件始终将 PKI 参与者称为组织或实体，尽管其中有些是个人。
<Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other designated "production". The offline CA is the top-level CA for the <name of organization> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>
<描述您将为 RPKI 运行的 CA。一种方法是运行两个 CA：一个指定为 "离线"，另一个指定为 "生产"。离线 CA 是 RPKI 的<组织名称>部分的顶级 CA。它提供安全的撤销和恢复能力，以防生产 CA 遭到破坏或不可用。因此，离线 CA 只向生产 CA 的实例签发证书，它签发的 CRL 只用于撤销向生产 CA 签发的证书。生产 CA 用于向已分发 INR 的<组织名称>成员签发 RPKI 证书。
<Describe how the Registration Authority (RA) function is handled for the CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment or use of a separate Registration Authority in addition to the CA function. The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the RA function implicitly, since they already assume responsibility for distributing INRs.>
<描述如何为您运营的 CA 处理注册机构（RA）功能。RPKI 不要求在 CA 功能之外建立或使用单独的注册机构。RA 功能必须由作为 CA 运行的同一实体提供，如第 1.3.1 节中列出的实体。在本 PKI 中充当 CA 的实体已经与它向其分发 INR 的每个组织建立了正式关系。这些组织已经隐式地执行了 RA 功能，因为它们已经承担了分发 INR 的责任。
Organizations receiving INR allocations from this CA are subscribers in the RPKI.
从该 CA 获得 INR 分配的组织是 RPKI 的用户。
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
依赖本 PKI 签发的证书或 RPKI 签名对象行事的实体或个人是依赖方。依赖方可以是也可以不是本 PKI 中的用户。(有关 RPKI 签名对象的定义，请参见第 1.6 节）。
<Specify one or more entities that operate a repository holding certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects issued by this organization, and provide a URL for the repository.>
<指定一个或多个实体负责运行一个存储库，存储本组织签发的证书、证书的有效期限和其他 RPKI 签名对象，并提供存储库的 URL>。
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
在这一等级制度下签发的证书用于授权，以支持对当前持有的 INR 的要求进行验证。
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under RFC 6484.
RFC 6484 还允许根据上述基本目标使用证书的其他用途。
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4. Such uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
在该公钥基础设施下签发的某些证书可用于支持该基础设施的运行，例如第 2.4 节所述的存储库系统的访问控制。RPKI 证书政策也允许此类用途。
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
除第 1.4.1 节所述用途外，禁止任何其他用途。
This CPS is administered by <name of organization>. <Include the
mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>
<Insert organization contact info here.>
<此处插入组织联系信息>。
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
不适用。在本 PKI 中签发证书的每个组织都证明向证书中公开密钥对应的私钥持有者分发了 INR。签发机构与执行分发的机构是同一机构；因此，它们对该绑定的准确性具有权威性。
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
不适用。在本 PKI 中签发证书的每个组织都证明向证书中公开密钥对应的私钥持有者分发了 INR。签发机构与执行分发的机构是同一机构；因此，它们对该绑定的准确性具有权威性。
BPKI Business PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued. If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own CP, separate from the RPKI CP.
BPKI 业务 PKI。BPKI 是一种可选的附加 PKI，由组织用来识别可向其签发 RPKI 证书的成员。如果 BPKI 由 CA 使用，它可以有自己的 CP，与 RPKI CP 分开。
CP Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].
CP 证书策略。CP 是一组命名的规则，表明证书对具有共同安全要求的特定社区和/或应用类别的适用性。RPKI 的 CP 是 [RFC6484]。
CPS Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates.
CPS 认证惯例声明。CPS 是一份文件，规定了认证机构在签发证书时采用的做法。
Distribution of INRs A process of distribution of the INRs along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
INRs 的分配 INRs 按照各自的编号层次进行分配的过程。IANA 将 IP 地址块和自治系统号码 (ASN) 分配给五个地区互联网注册管理机构 (RIR)。区域互联网注册管理机构将较小的地址块和自治系统号码分配给其服务区域内的组织，这些组织再将 IP 地址分配给其客户。
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to RIRs.
IANA 互联网编号分配机构。IANA 负责在全球范围内协调用于路由互联网流量的互联网协议寻址系统和 ASN。IANA 向区域互联网注册管理机构分发 INR。
INRs Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely:
INRs 互联网号码资源。INR 是三个协议参数集的号码值，即
o IP version 4 addresses,
o IP 第 4 版地址、
o IP version 6 addresses, and
o IP 版本 6 地址，以及
o Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.
o 用于互联网域间路由选择的标识符，目前是边界网关协议-4 ASN。
ISP Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations.
ISP 互联网服务提供商。ISP 是一个管理并向其他组织销售互联网服务的机构。
NIR National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR distribution.
NIR 国家互联网注册机构。国家互联网注册机构是一个组织，负责管理区域互联网注册机构所覆盖的部分地缘政治区域的 INR 分配。国家互联网注册管理机构在用于管理 INR 分布的树形方案中构成可选的第二层。
RIR Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RIR 地区互联网注册机构。区域互联网注册管理机构是一个管理地缘政治区域互联网注册管理机构分布的组织。
RPKI-signed object An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such an object by a Standards Track RFC. An RPKI-signed object can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].
RPKI 签名对象 RPKI 签名对象是由标准跟踪 RFC 声明的数字签名数据对象（证书或 CRL 除外）。RPKI 签名对象可使用该 PKI 签发的证书进行验证。这些数据结构的内容和格式取决于对 INR 当前持有量声明进行验证的环境。这些对象的例子包括存储库清单 [RFC6486] 和路由起源授权 (ROAs) [RFC6482]。
As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate this data.
根据国家方案，所有依赖方都必须能下载证书、CRL 和 RPKI 签名对象，以便验证这些数据。
The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via <insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>. This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481].
<组织名称> RPKI CA 将通过一个存储库发布证书、CRL 和 RPKI 签名对象，该存储库可通过 <此处插入 IETF 指定的协议名称> 在 <此处插入 URL> 进行访问。该存储库将符合 [RFC6481] 中描述的结构。
<Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories.
<组织名称>将把其签发的证书、CRL 和 RPKI 签名对象发布到一个存储库，该存储库作为全球分布式 RPKI 存储库系统的一部分运行。
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global repository system) of the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this information for relying parties. This MUST include the period of time within which a certificate will be published after the CA issues the certificate, and the period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked certificate, after the CA revokes that certificate.>
<在此说明贵机构公布（向全球存储库系统公布）所签发证书、证书废止列表和 RPKI 签名对象的程序。如果贵机构选择外包发布 PKI 数据，则仍需为依赖方提供此信息。这必须包括 CA 签发证书后公布证书的期限，以及 CA 撤销证书后公布带有已撤销证书条目的 CRL 的期限。
The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
<组织名称> CA 将在该 CA 以前发布的预定 CRL 中的 nextUpdate 值之前发布其 CRL。
<Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository. If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers, then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing signed objects from subscribers.>
<描述组织为确保只有授权方才能修改版本库数据而使用的访问控制，以及为减少针对版本库的拒绝服务攻击而使用的任何控制。如果组织向其用户提供版本库服务，则在此描述其支持的用于发布来自用户的签名对象的协议。
The subject of each certificate issued by this organization is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by <name of organization>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
该机构签发的每张证书的主体都由 X.500 区分名称 (DN) 标识。该区分名称由单个通用名 (CN) 属性组成，其值由 < 组织名称> 生成。序列号属性也可选择与通用名一起包含（形成终端相对区分名称集），以区分与同一实体相关的连续证书实例。
The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", in the conventional, human-readable sense. The rationale here is that these certificates are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are not used to identify subjects.
每份证书中的主体名称不应具有传统的、人类可读的 "意义"。这样做的理由是，这些证书用于授权，以支持使用 INR 持有证明的应用程序。它们不是用来识别主体的。
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this organization SHOULD NOT be meaningful and may appear "random", anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is provided.
虽然本机构签发的证书中的主题名不应该有意义，可能会显得 "随机"，但匿名性并不是本 PKI 的功能之一；因此，本机构不提供对该功能的明确支持。
None
无
<Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is not required, nor is it enforced through technical means. <Name of organization> generates Subject names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name. Specifically, <insert Subject name generation description here, or cite RFC 6487>.
<机构名称>认证的主体名称在其签发的证书中是唯一的。虽然这些主题名最好在整个 PKI 中都是唯一的，以便于发现证书路径，但这种唯一性不是必需的，也不会通过技术手段强制执行。<组织名称> 生成主体名称的目的是尽量减少 RPKI 中两个实体被分配相同名称的机会。具体来说，<此处插入主体名称生成说明，或引用 RFC 6487>。
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.
由于主题名称没有意义，<组织名称>既不承认也不认证商标、服务标记等。
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to certificate issuance.>
<说明在签发证书之前，每个用户必须出示与证书中公用钥匙相对应的私人钥匙的持有证明（PoP）的方法>。
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of subscribers. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization> records.
本 PKI 签发的证书不证明用户的组织身份。不过，向用户签发证书的方式可以保持<组织名称>记录中所代表的 INR 分布的准确性。
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution records. The certificate request could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber. The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution.>
<描述为确保所签发的每张 RPKI 证书准确地反映贵机构与该证书中标识的 INR 的分发（或分 发）机构有关的记录而将使用的程序。例如，BPKI 证书可用于验证证书请求，该证书请求是与维护 INR 分发记录的 < 机构名称> 用户数据库的链接。证书请求可与有关订户的数据库记录相匹配，只有当所请求的 INR 是该订户所持有的 INR 的子集时，才会签发 RPKI 证书。为此目的采用的具体程序应与你们在维护 INR 分布时采用的任何程序相称。
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber. However, <name of organization> maintains contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate renewal, re-key, and revocation.
本 PKI 签发的证书不证明用户的个人身份。不过，<机构名称> 会保留每个用户的联系信息，以支持证书更新、重新密钥和撤销。
<Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. For example, one might say "The <name of organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization> subscribers." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this CA/subscriber relationship.>
<说明用于识别每个用户的至少一名代表的程序。这样做是为了支持向组织签发、更新和撤销证书。例如，可以说"<组织名称> BPKI（见第 3.2.6 节）颁发的证书必须用于识别代表<组织名称>用户的个人"。认证程序应与认证个人作为 INR 持有者代表的程序相一致。请注意，这种身份验证仅用于贵机构与被贵机构分发（或转发）INR 的组织打交道时使用，因此不得在这种 CA/订户关系之外依赖这种身份验证。
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions [RFC6487].
除主题信息访问（SIA）扩展[RFC6487]外，根据本证书政策签发的证书不包含任何未经验证的用户数据。
<Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could say "Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives of subscribers.>
<描述用于验证声称代表某用户的个人是否被授权在此情况下代表该用户的程序。例如，可以说 "只有已获得 BPKI 证书（见第 3.2.6 节）的个人才能请求签发 RPKI 证书。每份证书签发申请都要使用 BPKI 进行验证"。这些程序应与认证个人作为用户代表时所采用的程序相一致。
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource distributions.>
RPKI 既不打算也不设计用于与任何其他 PKI 进行互操作。<如果贵机构出于业务目的运行单独的、额外的 PKI，例如 BPKI，那么请描述（或参考）BPKI 如何用于验证用户身份并使其能够管理其资源分配。
<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
<说明要求例行重新键入的条件和申请方式。说明用于确保请求例行重新密钥的用户是要重新密钥的证书的合法持有者的程序。說明建立與新公開密碼匙對應的私人密碼匙 PoP 的方法。如果运行 BPKI，请说明如何使用 BPKI 验证例行密钥重配请求。
<Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This MUST also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>
<说明用于确保在证书废止后请求重新密钥的机构是被重新密钥证书中 INR 的合法持有者的程序。这还必须包括验证与新公开密钥相对应的私钥的 PoP 所采用的方法。如果使用 BPKI，请说明如何使用该 BPKI 验证重新配匙请求。关于用户的认证，程序应与维护 INR 分发记录时已采用的程序相称。
<Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
<说明 RPKI 用户提出废止请求的程序。说明如何确保提出废止请求的用户是要废止的证书主体（或其授权代表）。请注意，合法主体仍拥有原始私钥的情况与不再拥有该私钥的情况可能有不同的程序。这些程序应与你在维护用户记录时已经采用的程序相称。
Any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name of organization> may submit a certificate application to this CA. (The exact meaning of "in good standing" is in accordance with the policy of <name of organization>.)
任何持有由<组织名称>分发的INR的信誉良好的订户均可向该CA提交证书申请。("信誉良好 "的确切含义根据<组织名称>的政策)。
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices are documented.>
<说明贵机构为初次部署公钥基础设施和作为持续过程签发证书的注册过程。请注意，本 PKI 中的大多数证书都是作为正常业务实践的一部分签发的，是 INR 分发的辅助手段，因此可能不需要单独申请证书。如果需要，则应参考这些做法的记录。
<Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate application processing (see [RFC6487]).>
<说明你将采用的证书请求/响应处理方法。你应利用现有的证书申请处理标准（见 [RFC6487]）。
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made to documentation of such existing practices.>
<说明贵机构对证书申请者进行识别和认证的做法。通常情况下，贵机构用于识别和认证组织的现行做法可作为向这些用户签发证书的依据。可参考此类现行做法的文件>。
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications, and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
<说明贵机构批准或拒绝申请的做法，并参考与此过程有关的现有业务做法的文件。请注意，根据国家方案，证书申请将根据运行 CA 的实体的正常业务惯例，并根据 CA 的用户记录进行审批。憑證政策亦指出，每間核證機關會按照第 3.2.1 節所訂明的程序，核實申請人持有的私人密碼匙是否與核證機關簽 發給申請人的證書所綁定的公開密碼匙相符。
<Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate applications.>
<请说明处理证书申请的预期时间>。
<Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a certificate.>
<请说明贵国签发和公布证书的程序>。
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. <Describe here your procedures for notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>
<机构名称>将在证书发布时通知用户。<请说明在证书发布时通知用户的程序>。
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>
<在此描述证书发布时将被通知的任何其他实体>。
When a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. <This may be done without subscriber review and acceptance. State your policy with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>
签发证书后，<组织名称> CA 将把证书发布到存储库并通知用户。<这可以不经用户审查和接受。请在此说明贵机构关于用户接受证书的政策。
Certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1. This will be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe any additional procedures with respect to publication of the certificate here.>
证书签发后，将按照第 4.4.1 节所述程序在 <此处插入存储库 URL> 发布。这项工作将在<指定证书放入存储库并通知用户的时限>内完成。<在此说明有关公布证书的其它程序>。
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>
<在此说明发布证书时将收到通知的任何其他实体>。
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
下文概述了 RPKI 的使用模式。
The certificates issued by <name of organization> to subordinate INR holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs.
由<组织名称>签发给下属 INR 持有者的证书是 CA 证书。与每个证书相关的私钥用于签署下级（CA 或 EE）证书和 CRL。
The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations that use RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Relying parties are referred to Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] for additional guidance with respect to acts of reliance on RPKI certificates.
本 PKI 的主要依赖方是使用 RPKI EE 证书验证 RPKI 签名对象的组织。依赖方可参阅 [RFC6484] 第 4.5.2 节，了解有关依赖 RPKI 证书行为的更多指导。
As per RFC 6484, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing a resource holding agreement, or explicit. If <name of organization> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with notification of service expiration">. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
根据 RFC 6484 的规定，证书的更新将根据其到期日或证书主体的更新请求进行处理。续期请求可以是隐式的，即续期资源持有协议的副作用，也可以是显式的。如果 < 机构名称> 根据证书到期日启动续期程序，则 < 机构名称> 将通知用户 < 插入提前警告时间，如 "到期日前 2 周"，或一般政策，如 "与服务到期通知一起">。新（续）证书的有效期将与旧证书的有效期重叠<插入重叠期的长度，如 1 周>，以确保不间断的覆盖。
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised (see Section 4.9.1). If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply.
证书更新将使用与上一证书相同的公开密钥，除非私人密钥已被报告失密（见第 4.9.1 节）。如果使用新的配对密钥，则适用第 4.7 节的规定。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the renewal process. <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed. This MUST also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key if the public key is being changed. With respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate renewal requests, and refer to Section 3.2.6.>
用户或<组织名称>可启动更新程序。<对于用户的情况，描述为确保申请者是被更新证书中 INR 的合法持有者而使用的程序。这还必须包括验证与被续期证书中公开密钥相对应的私人密钥的 PoP 所采用的方法，或在公开密钥被更改时验证新公开密钥的方法。关于用户的认证，程序应与你在维护 INR 分发记录时已采用的程序相称。如果贵机构为此使用了 BPKI，请说明如何使用基于业务的 PKI 来验证续期请求，并参考第 3.2.6.> 节。
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests. Describe how you verify that the requester is the subscriber or is authorized by the subscriber, and that the certificate in question has not been revoked.>
<说明贵机构处理证书更新请求的程序。说明贵公司如何验证申请者是用户或经用户授权，以及有关证书未被吊销。
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent with Section 4.3.2.>
<机构名称>将在证书发布时通知用户。<说明贵机构向用户通知新证书发布的程序。这应与第 4.3.2 节一致>。
See Section 4.4.1. <If you employ a different policy from that specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>
请参见第 4.4.1 节。<如果采用与第 4.4.1 节规定不同的政策，请在此处说明>。
See Section 4.4.2.
参见第 4.4.2 节。
See Section 4.4.3.
参见第 4.4.3 节。
As per RFC 6484, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when required, based on:
根据 RFC 6484 的规定，只有在需要时才会根据以下条件重新密钥证书：
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or
1. 知道或怀疑相关私人密钥被泄露或丢失，或
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair
2. 相关密钥对的加密寿命到期
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key.
如果为替换 RFC 3779 扩展而撤销证书，则替换证书将使用相同的公开密钥，而不是新密钥。
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked.
如果重新密钥是基于疑似泄露的情况，那么之前的证书将被吊销。
Only the holder of a certificate may request a re-key. In addition, <name of organization> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the <name of registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>
只有证书持有者才能申请重新密钥。此外，<机构名称> 可根据经核实的失密报告启动重新密钥。<如果用戶（證書主體）要求重新鑰匙，請說明如何進行認證，例如使用<註冊處名稱> BPKI。说明如何验证从用户以外收到的泄密报告。
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>
<说明贵方处理重新配匙请求的流程。根据 RPKI CP，这应与第 4.3 节中描述的流程一致，因此可参考该节。
<Describe your policy for notifying the subscriber regarding availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see Section 4.3.2).>
<说明贵机构通知用户新的重新键入证书可用性的政策。这应与任何新证书签发的通知程序一致（见第 4.3.2 节）。
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.
签发重新密钥证书时，CA 将在存储库中公布并通知用户。参见第 4.4.1 节。
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
<说明贵机构有关公布新证书的政策。这应与任何新证书的公布程序一致（见第 4.4.2 节）。
See Section 4.4.3.
参见第 4.4.3 节。
As per RFC 6484, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber, or as a result of change of the repository publication point data.
根据 RFC 6484，修改证书的目的是对 RFC 3779 扩展值或证书中的 SIA 扩展进行修改。当当前有效证书中的这些信息发生变化、用户持有的 INR 发生变化或存储库公布点数据发生变化时，用户可请求修改证书。
If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate will be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new distribution) issued.
如果订户要在当前的 INR 分配之外再接收 INR 分配，而且订户不要求签发只包含这些额外 INR 的新证书，则可通过证书修改来实现。当证书修改被批准后，就会签发新的证书。新证书将包含与原证书相同的公用钥匙和相同的有效期，但附带信息已更正和/或 INR 分发范围已扩大。如果要从证书中删除以前分发的 INR，则旧证书将被废止，并签发新证书（反映新的分发情况）。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the certificate modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>
用户或<机构名称>可启动证书修改程序。<如果是用户，请说明将采取哪些步骤来验证请求修改实体的身份和授权>。
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1.>
<说明修改申请的验证程序和签发新证书的程序。这些程序应与第 4.2 节和第 4.3.1 节所述的程序一致>。
<Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process for any new certificate (see Section 4.3.2).>
<描述贵机构通知用户签发修改证书的程序。这应与任何新证书的通知程序一致（见第 4.3.2 节）。
When a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.
当签发修改后的证书时，<组织名称> 将把它发布到存储库并通知用户。参见第 4.4.1 节。
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
<说明公布修改证书的程序。该程序应与任何新证书的公布程序一致（见第 4.4.2 节）。
See Section 4.4.3.
参见第 4.4.3 节。
As per RFC 6484, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either <name of organization> or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
根据 RFC 6484，证书可因多种原因被撤销。< 组织名称> 或主体可选择终止证书中表达的关系，从而产生废止证书的原因。如果与证书中的公开密钥绑定的一个或多个 INR 不再与主体相关联，也会构成废止证书的原因。证书也可因与证书中公开密钥相对应的私人密钥丢失或受损而被废止。最后，为了使与证书相关的私人钥匙所签署的数据失效，证书也可被废止。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation. <For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the revocation.>
用户或<组织名称>可请求撤销。<对于用户，请说明将采取哪些步骤来核实请求撤销的实体的身份和授权>。
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request. This should include:
<描述处理证书废止请求的流程。其中应包括
o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.
o 用户申请撤销的程序。
o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation is initiated by <name of organization>.>
o 当<组织名称>发起撤销时通知用户的程序。
A subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified.
用户必须在确定需要撤销后尽快申请撤销。
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will process a revocation request.>
<请说明贵方处理撤销申请的期限政策>。
As per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
根据 RFC 6484，依赖方有责任在验证证书时，从证书签发方获取并检查最新的、预定的 CRL。
<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.> Each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. <Name of organization> will set the nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued.
<说明您发布的 CRL 的 CRL 发布频率> 每个 CRL 都包含一个 nextUpdate 值，新的 CRL 将在该时间或之前发布。<组织名称>将在发布 CRL 时设置 nextUpdate 值，以提示下一个预定 CRL 的发布时间。
A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the maximum latency> after generation.
CRL 生成后将在<说明最大延迟时间>内发布到版本库系统。
<Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP). <Name of organization> issues CRLs.
<组织名称>不支持联机证书状态协议 (OCSP) 或基于服务器的证书验证协议 (SCVP)。<组织名称>发布 CRL。
<As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据 RFC 6484，说明证书管理所采用的物理控制措施。这些控制措施应与 INR 分发管理中使用的控制措施相称。
<As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据 RFC 6484，说明证书管理所采用的程序安全控制。这些控制措施应与 INR 分发管理中使用的控制措施相称。
<As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据 RFC 6484，说明贵机构对与证书管理有关的人员采取的人员安全控制措施。这些控制措施应与 INR 分发管理中使用的控制措施相称。
<As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how you implement audit logging.>
<按照国家方案，在以下章节中详细说明如何实施审计日志记录>。
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the Certification Authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
将为验证局计算设备的基本操作生成审计记录。审计记录将包括日期、时间、负责用户或流程，以及与事件相关的摘要内容数据。可审计的事件包括
o Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
o 访问 CA 计算机设备（如登录、注销）
o Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
o 收到的请求 CA 采取行动的信息（如证书请求、证书撤销请求、泄密通知等）
o Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
o 证书创建、修改、撤销或续期操作
o Posting of any material to a repository
o 向存储处张贴任何材料
o Any attempts to change or delete audit data
o 任何更改或删除审计数据的尝试
o Key generation
o 密钥生成
o Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
o CA 的软件和/或配置更新
o Clock adjustments
o 时钟调整
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
<在此列出要审计的其他事件类型>。
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
<请说明审查审计日志的程序>。
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
<描述您的审计日志保留政策>。
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
<描述保护审计日志的政策>。
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
<说明备份审计日志的策略>。
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
<描述您将对 PKI 子系统进行（或已经进行）的任何漏洞评估。这应包括是否已进行过此类评估，以及今后执行或重复/重新评估漏洞的任何程序或计划。
The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that certificate. When <name of organization> CA changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489].
< 组织名称> CA 证书包含的有效期至少与该证书下签发的任何证书的有效期一样长。当 < 组织名称> CA 更改密钥时，它将遵循 [RFC6489] 中描述的程序。
<Describe your plans for dealing with CA key compromise and how you plan to continue/restore operation of your RPKI CA in the event of a disaster.>
<描述处理 CA 密钥泄露的计划，以及发生灾难时如何继续/恢复 RPKI CA 运行的计划>。
<Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions in case of its own termination.>
<描述在 CA 自行终止的情况下管理 CA INR 分配的政策>。
This section describes the security controls used by <name of organization>.
本节介绍 < 组织名称> 使用的安全控制。
<Describe the procedures used to generate the CA key pair and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they so request.>
<说明用于生成 CA 密钥对以及（如适用）用户密钥对的程序。在大多数情况下，公用密钥对将由订户（即接受 INR 分配的组织）生成。但是，如果用户提出要求，你的程序也可以包括代表用户生成密钥对的程序。
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise, say this is not applicable.>
<如果第 6.1.1 节中的程序包括为用户提供配对密钥生成服务，请说明以安全方式向用户提供私人密钥的方法。否则，请说明这一点不适用。
<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA. These procedures MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.> See RFC 6487 for details.
<描述向<组织名称>RPKI CA 传递用户公开密钥所使用的程序。这些程序必须确保公开密钥在传输过程中没有被更改，而且用户拥有与传输的公开密钥相对应的私钥。
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community.
所有实体（信任锚除外）的 CA 公钥都包含在其他 CA 签发的证书中，并将发布到 RPKI 存储库系统。依赖方将从该系统下载这些证书。公开密钥值和（推定）信任锚的相关数据将在带外发布，并由依赖方根据本地定义的标准接受，例如嵌入将提供给互联网社区的路径验证软件中。
The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].
本 PKI 使用的密钥大小如 [RFC6485] 所规定。
The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].
本 PKI 使用的公钥算法和参数如 [RFC6485] 所述。
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
<如果第6.1.1节中的程序包括用户密钥对的生成，要么在此插入文本，说明用户负责对其密钥对的质量进行检查，并说明<组织名称>不负责对用户进行此类检查，要么描述CA用于检查这些用户密钥对质量的程序。
The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are specified in [RFC6487].
RPKI 证书中使用的 KeyUsage 扩展位值在 [RFC6487] 中规定。
<Describe the standards and controls employed for the CA cryptographic module, e.g., it was evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3. See [FIPS] for details.>
<描述 CA 密码模块采用的标准和控制措施，例如，根据 FIPS 140-2/3 进行的 2 级或 3 级评估。详情请参见 [FIPS]。
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.">
<No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI, but if the CA chooses to employ escrow, state so here.>
<RPKI不需要私钥托管程序，但如果 CA 选择使用托管，请在此处说明。
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key. The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
<描述用于备份 CA 私钥的程序。应包括以下方面。(1) 复制应在与控制原始私钥相同的多方控制下进行。(2) 至少应在异地保存一份副本，以备灾难恢复之用。
See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.
参见第 6.2.3 和 6.2.4 节。
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in Section 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.1 节中指定的加密模块将生成<组织名称>生产 CA（如果合适，将 "生产 CA "改为 "生产和离线 CA"）的私钥。私钥永远不会离开模块，除非以加密形式备份和/或转移到新模块。
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be stored in the cryptographic module. It will be protected from unauthorized use <say how here>.
<组织名称>生产 CA 的私钥<如果合适，将 "生产 CA "改为 "生产和离线 CA">将存储在加密模块中。它将受到保护，不会被未经授权使用<此处说明如何使用>。
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private key.>
<描述用于激活 CA 私钥的机制和数据>。
<Describe the process and procedure for private key deactivation here.>
<此处描述停用私人密钥的过程和程序>。
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g., when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
<描述用于销毁 CA 私钥的方法，例如当 CA 被取代时。这取决于特定的模块。
<Describe the rating of the cryptographic module used by the CA, if applicable.>
<描述 CA 使用的加密模块的评级（如果适用）>。
<Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. If keys are not archived, say so. If they are, describe the archive processes and procedures.>
<由于此 PKI 不支持不可抵赖性，因此没有必要存档公钥。如果密钥不存档，请说明。如果需要存档，请说明存档过程和程序。
The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of <insert number of years>. <These key pairs and certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover. Note that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>
<机构名称> CA 的配对密钥的有效期为<插入年数>。<这些密钥对和证书的有效期间隔应合理地长一些，如 10 年，以尽量减少密钥更换造成的中断。请注意，CA 的密钥有效期由其签发者控制，因此 CPS 必须反映签发者规定的密钥有效期。
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
<描述如何生成 CA 的激活数据>。
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe your procedures here>.
CA 私钥的激活数据将由 <此处描述您的程序> 保护。
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None".>
<在此添加您希望提供的有关 CA 激活数据的任何详细信息。如果没有，请注明 "无"。
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
<描述用于支持该 PKI 的计算机的安全要求，例如，对验证登录、审计能力等的要求。这些要求应与用于管理 INRs 分发的计算机的要求相一致。
<Describe any system development controls that apply to the PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology (TSDM).>
<描述适用于公钥基础设施系统的任何系统开发控制措施，例如使用可信系统开发方法（TSDM）>。
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
<說明核證機關使用的 RPKI 軟體及設備所使用的安全管理控制。这些安全措施应与核证机构用于管理和分发INR的系统所使用的安全措施相称。
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.>
<说明如何采购、安装、维护和更新用于 RPKI 功能的设备（硬件和软件）。这应与管理和分发 INR 的设备的处理方式相一致。
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA operation. These should be commensurate with the network security controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
<描述 CA 运行将使用的网络安全控制。这些控制措施应与用于管理 INR 分配的计算机的网络安全控制措施相称。
The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping.
RPKI 不使用时间戳。
See [RFC6487].
参见 [RFC6487]。
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the RPKI systems. However, additional forms of security assessments are a good idea and should be listed if performed.>
<在此列出用于确保 INR 管理安全的审计和其他评估。这些对于 RPKI 系统来说已经足够。不过，其他形式的安全评估也是一个好主意，如果已进行，也应列出。
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover Sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.16, although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
<以下部分为可选项。请根据贵机构的情况填写。标准规定 CA 应涵盖第 9.1 节至第 9.11 节和第 9.13 节至第 9.16 节，但并非每个 CA 都会选择这样做。请注意，贵机构管理本 PKI 的业务和法律事务的方式应与管理 INRs 分发的业务和法律事务的方式相一致。
<END TEMPLATE TEXT>
< 结束模板文本
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
依赖方对证书所体现的约束力的信任程度取决于几个因素。这些因素包括
o the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in authenticating the subject
o 认证机构（CA）在验证主体时遵循的做法
o the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key)
o CA 的运行政策、程序和技术安全控制，包括用户的责任范围（例如，在保护私钥方面）； - CA 的运行政策、程序和技术安全控制，包括用户的责任范围（例如，在保护私钥方面
o the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability)
o CA 规定的责任和责任条款及条件（例如，保证、免责声明和责任限制）
This document provides a framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation are done in a secure manner. Specifically, the following sections are oriented towards ensuring the secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems:
本文件提供了一个框架，以解决认证机构、注册机构、存储库、订户和依赖方密码模块的技术、程序、人员和物理安全方面的问题，从而确保证书的生成、发布、续期、重新密钥、使用和撤销以安全的方式进行。具体来说，以下各节旨在确保公钥基础设施实体（如 CA、RA、存储库、用户系统和依赖方系统）的安全运行：
Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A)) Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements") Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls") Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls") Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles") Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")
第 3 节（"身份识别与验证"（I&A）） 第 4 节（"证书生命周期运行要求"） 第 5 节（"设施、管理和运行控制"） 第 6 节（"技术安全控制"） 第 7 节（"证书和 CRL 配置文件"） 第 8 节（"合规性审核和其他评估）
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>。
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/ info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/ info/rfc6485>。
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>。
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.
[FIPS]联邦信息处理标准出版物 140-3（FIPS-140-3），"密码模块的安全要求"，美国国家标准与技术研究院信息技术实验室，进行中的工作。
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>。
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>。
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>。
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>。
Acknowledgments
致谢
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for help with the formatting, Ron Watro for assistance with the editing, and other members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document.
作者感谢 Matt Lepinski 帮助排版、Ron Watro 协助编辑以及 SIDR 工作组其他成员审阅本文件。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 EMail: [email protected]
Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 EMail: [email protected]
Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 EMail: [email protected]