Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Lepinski
Request for Comments: 6482 S. Kent
Category: Standards Track D. Kong
ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN Technologies
February 2012
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
路由原点授权（ROA）简介
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block.
本文件定义了路由起源授权（ROA）的标准配置文件。ROA 是一种数字签名对象，它提供了一种验证 IP 地址块持有者已授权自治系统（AS）向地址块内的一个或多个前缀发送路由的方法。
Status of This Memo
本备忘录的地位
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组 (IETF) 的成果。它代表了 IETF 社区的共识。它已接受公众审查，并经互联网工程指导小组 (IESG) 批准发布。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见 RFC 5741 第 2 节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482.
有关本文件的当前状态、任何勘误以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482。
Copyright Notice
版权声明
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有 (c) 2012 IETF 信托基金会和文件作者。保留所有权利。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文档受 BCP 78 和本文档发布之日有效的 IETF 信托基金《与 IETF 文档有关的法律规定》 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) 的约束。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文档的权利和限制。从本文档中提取的代码组件必须包含信托法律条款第 4.e 节中所述的简化 BSD 许可文本，并且不提供简化 BSD 许可中所述的担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
2. The ROA Content-Type ............................................3
3. The ROA eContent ................................................3
3.1. version ....................................................4
3.2. asID .......................................................4
3.3. ipAddrBlocks ...............................................4
4. ROA Validation ..................................................5
5. Security Considerations .........................................5
6. Acknowledgments .................................................6
7. References ......................................................6
7.1. Normative References .......................................6
7.2. Informative References .....................................6
Appendix A: ASN.1 Module..........................................8
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A ROA provides this function.
资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的主要目的是提高路由安全性（详见 [RFC6480]）。(作为该系统的一部分，需要一种机制来允许实体验证一个 AS 是否已获得 IP 地址块持有者的许可，可以向该地址块内的一个或多个前缀发布路由广告。ROA 提供了这一功能。
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:
ROA 使用 RPKI 数字签名对象模板 [RFC6488]，该模板为 ROA 内容定义了 Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] 封装以及 RPKI 签名对象的通用验证程序。因此，为了完成 ROA 的规范（见 [RFC6488] 第 4 节），本文档定义了以下内容：
1. The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object).
1. 标识已签名对象为 ROA 的 OID。(该 OID 出现在 encapContentInfo 对象中的 eContentType 以及 signerInfo 对象中的内容类型签名属性中）。
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].
2. ROA 电子内容的 ASN.1 语法。(这是指定被授权发起路由的 AS 以及该 AS 可发起路由的前缀的有效载荷）。ROA 电子内容使用区分编码规则（Distinguished Encoding Rules，DER）[X.690] 进行 ASN.1 编码。
3. An additional step required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
3. 验证 ROA 所需的额外步骤（除 [RFC6488] 中规定的验证步骤外）。
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
假定读者熟悉 "互联网 X.509 公钥基础设施证书和证书吊销列表 (CRL) 简介" [RFC5280] 和 "IP 地址和 AS 标识符的 X.509 扩展" [RFC3779] 中描述的术语和概念。
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus, familiarly with that profile is also assumed.
此外，本文档还使用了 RPKI 签名对象配置文件 [RFC6488]；因此，假定您已熟悉该文件。请注意，RPKI 签名对象配置文件使用的证书符合 RPKI 资源证书配置文件 [RFC6487]；因此也假定熟悉该配置文件。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
本文档中的关键词 "MUST"、"MUST NOT"、"REQUIRED"、"SHALL"、"SHALL NOT"、"SHOULD"、"SHOULD NOT"、"RECOMMENDED"、"NOT RECOMMENDED"、"MAY "和 "OPTIONAL "应按照 RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 中的描述进行解释。
The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
ROA 的内容类型定义为 routeOriginAuthz，数值为 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24。
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
该 OID 必须同时出现在 encapContentInfo 对象中的 eContentType 和 signerInfo 对象中的内容类型签名属性中（见 [RFC6488]）。
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:
ROA 的内容确定了地址空间持有者授权发起路由的单个 AS，以及一个或多个将要发布广告的 IP 地址前缀列表。如果地址空间持有者需要授权多个 AS 宣传同一组地址前缀，则持有者会发布多个 ROA，每个 AS 号一个。ROA 的正式定义如下
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
addresses SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress }
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
address IPAddress,
maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo (see [RFC6488]).
请注意，该内容将作为 eContent 出现在 encapContentInfo 中（见 [RFC6488]）。
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.
RouteOriginAttestation 的版本号必须为 0。
The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
asID 字段包含授权向给定 IP 地址前缀发送路由的 AS 编号。
The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in RFC 3779. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes.
ipAddrBlocks 字段编码了 AS 被授权发源路由的 IP 地址前缀集。请注意，这里的语法比 RFC 3779 中定义的 IP 地址授权扩展中使用的语法更严格。该扩展可以表示任意地址范围，而 ROA 只需表示前缀。
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002.
在 ROAIPAddressFamily 结构中，addressFamily 包含 IP 地址族的地址族标识符（AFI）。本规范仅支持 IPv4 和 IPv6。因此，addressFamily 必须是 0001 或 0002。
Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress. (See [RFC3779] for more details). If present, the maxLength MUST be an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and less than or equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family (32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. (For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113/24 and the maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.0/25, but not 203.0.113.0/27.) When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROA.
在 ROAIPAddress 结构中，地址字段将前缀表示为 IPAddress 类型的序列。(详见 [RFC3779]）。如果存在，maxLength 必须是一个大于或等于所附前缀长度的整数，并且小于或等于地址族中 IP 地址的长度（以比特为单位）（IPv4 为 32 比特，IPv6 为 128 比特）。如果存在，maxLength 会指定 AS 授权发布的 IP 地址前缀的最大长度。(例如，如果 IP 地址前缀为 203.0.113/24，maxLength 为 26，则 AS 有权公布最大长度为 26 的任何更具体的前缀。在此示例中，AS 将被授权宣传 203.0.113/24、203.0.113.128/25 或 203.0.113.0/25，但不包括 203.0.113.0/27）。当 maxLength 不存在时，AS 只被授权宣传 ROA 中指定的确切前缀。
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. (Such a ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.) Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED as, in such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.
请注意，一个有效的 ROA 可能包含一个 IP 地址前缀（在 ROAIPAddress 元素中），而该 IP 地址前缀被另一个 IP 地址前缀（在单独的 ROAIPAddress 元素中）所包含。例如，ROA 可包含 maxLength 为 26 的前缀 203.0.113/24，以及 maxLength 为 28 的前缀 203.0.113.0/28。(这样的 ROA 将授权指定 AS 宣传以 203.0.113 开头的任何前缀，最小长度为 24，最大长度为 26，以及特定前缀 203.0.113.0/28）。此外，一个 ROA 可以包含两个 ROAIPAddress 元素，其中 IP 地址前缀在两种情况下都是相同的。但不推荐这样做，因为在这种情况下，maxLength 较短的 ROAIPAddress 不会向指定 AS 授予额外权限，因此可以省略而不改变 ROA 的含义。
Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation step.
在依赖方使用 ROA 验证路由通告之前，依赖方必须首先验证 ROA。要验证 ROA，依赖方必须执行 [RFC6488] 中规定的所有验证检查，以及以下额外的 ROA 特定验证步骤。
o The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and each IP address prefix(es) in the ROA is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
o IP 地址授权扩展[RFC3779]存在于最终实体（EE）证书中（包含在 ROA 中），ROA 中的每个 IP 地址前缀都包含在 EE 证书的 IP 地址授权扩展所指定的 IP 地址集合中。
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
ROA 中的数据没有保密假设；预计 ROA 将存储在所有互联网服务提供商都能访问的存储库中，也许所有互联网用户都能访问。ROA 没有明确的身份验证，因为用于 ROA 验证的 PKI 只提供授权而不提供身份验证。尽管 ROA 是经过签名的应用层对象，但并没有通过 ROA 传达不可抵赖性的意图。
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.
ROA 的目的是向 AS 传递授权，使其可以向 ROA 中的前缀发送路由。因此，必须确保 ROA 的完整性。ROA 规范使用 RPKI 签名对象格式；因此，[RFC6488] 中的所有安全考虑因素也适用于 ROA。此外，签名对象配置文件使用 CMS 签名消息格式来保证完整性；因此，ROA 继承了与该数据结构相关的所有安全注意事项。
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA match those in the certificate's address space extension.
通过使用 [RFC6480] 中描述的地址空间和 AS 号码 PKI，ROA 签名者有权授权目标 AS 开通指向前缀的路由。具体来说，必须使用根据此 PKI 签发的 X.509 证书来验证 ROA 上的签名，并检查 ROA 中的前缀是否与证书地址空间扩展中的前缀相匹配。
IANA has registered the following RPKI Signed Object:
IANA 已注册了以下 RPKI 签名对象：
ROA 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 [RFC6482]
ROA 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 [rfc6482]
The authors wish to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors would like to thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
作者感谢 Charles Gardiner 和 Russ Housley 的帮助和贡献。此外，作者还要感谢 Rob Austein、Roque Gagliano、Danny McPherson 和 Sam Weiler 的仔细审阅和有益评论。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5652] Housley, R.，"加密信息语法（CMS）"，STD 70，RFC 5652，2009 年 9 月。
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules：基本编码规则（BER）、规范编码规则（CER）和区分编码规则（DER）的规范。
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
Appendix A: ASN.1 Module
附录 A：ASN.1 模块
This normative appendix provides an ASN.1 module that specifies the ROA content in ASN.1 syntax.
本规范性附录提供了一个 ASN.1 模块，以 ASN.1 语法说明 ROA 内容。
RPKI-ROA { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) 61 }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
addresses SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress }
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
address IPAddress,
maxLength INTEGER OPTIONAL }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
END
结束
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Matt Lepinski BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]
Matt Lepinski BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]
Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]
Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 EMail: [email protected]